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Fact-Checking the story: Polaris Bank loses N26bn loans granted to 6 ex-directors without collaterals By Olalere Ojedokun
Fact-Checking the story: Polaris Bank loses N26bn loans granted to 6 ex-directors without collaterals
By Olalere Ojedokun
A report being syndicated by a section of online media with the title: Polaris Bank loses N26bn loans granted to 6 ex-directors without collaterals, made several claims in figures, interpretations and practices.
Claim 1. POLARIS Bank has lost N26.005 billion worth of loans granted to 6 ex-directors, mostly without collaterals
This claim is untrue, founded primarily on lack of understanding of accounting principles and convenient disregard of the denotative dates and notes to the accounts.
The story was based on the audited accounts and report for the year ended December 31, 2022. The report was approved on March 20, 2023. In line with the general comparative and accrual reportage format, the bank presented the status report for the preceding year ended December 31, 2021 and the reporting year ended December 31, 2022. The two comparative tables were clearly marked and were also evidently seen by the writer of the story. While the 2021 insider credit status report listed eight directors with total outstanding loans of N25.827 billion, the reporting year 2022 status report updated that four directors had fully liquidated their loans, a director had partially liquidated her loan while two directors had seen increase in outstandings against their names. The 2022 status report indicated a total of N31.646 billion insider credits related to the four remaining former directors. The 2022 report clearly indicated that Abimbola Izu, Dotun Adeniyi, Tokunbo Abiru and Theodora Onwughalu had paid their loans and as such, were not listed in 2022.
The 2022 report was clearly indicative of the changes and the compliance of the bank with the Prudential Guidelines and Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA). A former director, with related interest in Newcross Exploration and Production, Jason Fadeyi, whose loan of N25.442 billion in 2021 accounted for 98.5 per cent of the total outstanding insider credits in 2021, saw his total outstanding loan rising to N30.922 billion in 2022, ostensibly due to accrued interests and increase due to foreign exchange (forex) conversion rate as the loan is a foreign currency (US Dollar)-denominated loan. It’s a simple understanding that forex rate is a mediating factor in foreign currency denominated loan. The closing forex rates were generally available on the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)’s website. The Naira/US Dollar rate was N424.11 per US$ for the year ended December 31, 2021 and N461.1 per US$ for 2022. It was N400.33 per US$ in 2020. All these partially accounted for the year-on-year change in the loan. Meanwhile, Newcross Exploration/Fadeyi’s N30.922 billion accounted for 97.7 per cent of total outstanding insider credits in 2022.
Interestingly, as rightly reported by the story, this loan, N30.922 billion, has a perfected collateral, a debenture of the assets of the company. A further check indicated that Newcross Exploration/Fadeyi’s loan is a syndicated facility by eight banks with the FBN Trustees as the trustee managing the collateral on behalf of all the lenders. Jason Fadeyi was cited for the loan under the general principles of insiders which regard family members, relatives and associates as insiders. As rightly pointed out by the story, Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC)’s records showed that Newcross Exploration and Production was registered on July 9, 2013, with Festus Fadeyi and Bolaji Ogundare as persons with significant control of the company.
The second major insider credit in 2022 report was a N535 million loan credited to Mr. Tunde Ayeni, about 1.7 per cent of the total loans. This was classified as “performing”. Altogether, the collaterised, syndicated loan of Newcross Exploration/Fadeyi and “performing” loan of Ayeni accounted for about 99.4 per cent of total outstanding insider credits in 2022. All these were clearly stated and evident in the table which the reporter accessed, but failed due to poor interpretations and understanding of reportage format.
Claim 2: As of December 31, 2022, total outstanding loans owed by these ex-directors of Polaris Bank, some of which would not be repaid, amounted to N57.473 billion.
This claim is untrue, and flowing from the first claim, it exposed the poor understanding of the comparative reporting (going-concern) basis. To arrive at its claim of N57.473 billion, the reporter simply added the total outstanding insider credits in 2021 of N25.442 billion to total outstanding insider credits in 2022 of N31.646 billion. The reporter conveniently ignored the differential in year ending and the fact that the two tables, like other segments of the annual reports and accounts, were provided for comparative reporting. The reporter ignored the indicative narration showing that the Newcross Exploration/Fadeyi’s loan was same loan, moving from a reporting year to another reporting year. By implication, the story increased Newcross Exploration/Fadeyi’s loan to N56.364 billion, 98.1 per cent of its claimed total outstanding loans of N57.473 billion.
Further check of post-year end events, which are usually indicated in updates to accounts after year-end but prior to board’s final approval and signing off of the accounts, indicated that Demanta/Ibiye Ekong’s N89 million outstanding loan was fully paid off in February 2023. In essence, the only director-related insider loan outstanding is former Managing Director Timothy Oguntayo’s N100 million, which is a subject of reconciliation between the tripartite of employee, employer and regulator. As noted by the story, Oguntayo “who was earlier charged by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) but later exonerated”, had no misconduct established against him. As noted earlier, the Newcross Exploration/Fadeyi’s loan is a syndicated facility by eight banks with the FBN Trustees as the trustee managing the collateral on behalf of all the lenders. CBN’s Prudential Guidelines states that “For syndicated facilities, the classification shall be the same across all banks involved in the syndication. Thus, the worst classification by any of the banks involved in the syndication shall apply across board”.
Claim 3: Abimbola Izu, another ex-director, got N103 million mortgage loan from Polaris Bank but did not repay it, according to bank records. Her collateral perfection status was also recorded as “not applicable.” Bank records also showed that Izu took a term loan of N17 million with another “not applicable” collateral status.
This claim is untrue. The 2022 audited report, on which the story was based, showed that Izu was not indebted to the bank, having liquidated the prior year’s status report.
Claim 4: Fadeyi borrowed another N30.922 billion term loan from the bank – which has been placed on the watchlist.
This claim is false. It emanated from the poor understanding of the comparative reporting (accrual, going concern), basis. This claim particularly undercut the credibility of the entire story, obviously showing the reporter had no training or understanding of financial reporting/journalism. This also subjects the story to motive analysis as the reporter failed to adhere to a pattern of errors, rather zigzagging across erroneous claims to arrive at unsubstantiated claims. For instance, while doubling up Fadeyi’s, the story kept Oguntayo’s N100 million loan unchanged over the comparative years, but curiously reported Ekong’s loan as N89 million (2022 year-end outstanding) and N4 million, N4 million (two loans in 2021). Whereas, the 2021 report showed that Ekong owed a total of N108 million (N100 million by Demanta, N4 million, N4million), and by 2022, these reduced to N89 million, having liquidated the two N4 million, N4 million personal loans and reducing the N100 million related loan to Demanta to N89 million. A pattern of error would have simply added Ekong’s related loans of N108 million in 2021 with N89 million in 2022 to arrive at a false premise like Fadeyi’s. The story, cherry-picking of figures, simply reported N89 million while adding the two personal loans of N4 million each for Ekong as latest reporting year status.
Claim 5: Based on Polaris Bank’s records, Ibiyi Ekong of Demanta Nigeria Limited is another ex-director who took loans from the bank without repaying them. Ekong, a former executive director of the bank who resigned in 2016, owes the bank N89 million. Ekong also owes the bank N4 million borrowed as a mortgage loan and another N4 million taken as an auto loan, which was not repaid.
This claim is untrue. As explained above, the reporter engaged in convenient cherry-picking of figures, due to poor financial journalism background and lack of fidelity, even in its erroneous claims. While its claims based on the reporting year ended December 31, 2022 were false, post-reporting events showed that Demanta, which was the only Ekong-related insider credit outstanding in 2022, had been paid by February 2023, prior to the signing and final approval of the account in March 2023. The story: Polaris Bank loses N26bn loans granted to 6 ex-directors without collaterals, was first reported by one EconomyPost in October 27, 2023 and was reposted by one International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR) Nigeria on October 31, 2023. There were clearly other reporting periods that the writer could have sought updates on the post-year-end changes.
Claim 6: Theodora Amaka Onwughalu is another ex-director who borrowed N19 million mortgage loan from Polaris Bank but did not pay it back.
This claim is false. The 2022 reporting year status indicated Onwughalu was not indebted to the bank. Her total indebtedness of N19 million in 2021 had been paid by 2022.
Claim 7: Similarly, Dotun Adeniyi, an ex-director of Polaris Bank, borrowed N27 million mortgage loan from the financial institution but did not repay it.
This claim is false. The 2022 reporting year status indicated Adeniyi was not indebted to the bank. His total indebtedness of N27 million in 2021 had been paid by 2022.
Claim 8: Tokunbo Abiru, now a Lagos senator, was appointed the managing director of the then Skye Bank in 2016 but resigned in 2020 to fulfil his political ambition.
In its cherry-picking and convenient disregard for facts and figures, the story while narrating the Abiru’s relationship, ignored that the 2021 report indicated that Abiru, as an ex-director, had a related (taken by a company related under insiders’ principles) “performing” loan of N9 million in 2021 reporting year, which had been paid off by the 2022 reporting year.
Claim 9: Collateralisation of loans
The story sensationally placed “without collaterals” and ran under this theme alongside its cherry-picking of figures to portray an image of unusual, untoward or underhand transactions. Beside ignoring the fact that 98.5 per cent of the total outstanding insider-related credits in 2021 and 97.7 per cent of 2022’s report had a perfected collateral, and also 1.7 per cent of the 2022’s credit status was “performing”- altogether collateralized/performing status of 99.4 per cent in 2022; the story conveniently ignored the global banking practice, and as applicable in Nigeria as well, that secured and unsecured loans are typical in banks’ loan books. The credit risk assessment and banking rules allow banks to beyond collaterals, approve and grant loans to some extent (depending on each internal guidelines), based on subjective assessments. This is a generally available information and one of the basics in financial journalism classes. Loans, in terms of security, are generally divided into two- secured loans (with collaterals) and unsecured loans (without collaterals). The secured loans are so called because of the presence of a collateral, a physical asset that backed up the loan, which the lender has the right to take in the case of default. Unsecured loan is so called because of absence of physical asset, but in the reality of credit risk assessment and recovery, it’s secured by personal goodwill and standing, a case-by-case subjective assessment of a customer’s credit worthiness and the size of the loan. In any case, the lender has the option of recourse to court to enforce recovery of “unsecured loan”, in the event of a default.
In a February 24, 2022 report titled “Here are banks that offer loans without collateral”, Business Day (businessday.ng), a leading business and economy daily, reported increased demand for “unsecured lending” among Nigerian Deposit Money Banks (DMBs). The newspaper reported that “as seen in the latest data from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), demand for unsecured lending has been on the rise but lower than the demand in the pre-COVID-19 years”. The story listed not less than eight banks that were offering “loans without collateral” to the general public, including Nigeria’s four largest banks. In recognition of its status as acceptable banking/lending practice, the BOFIA included provisions guiding unsecured lending.
Claim 10: Insiders
The story ran a villainous theme of undue characterization of insiders’ transactions in banks, either out of poor understanding or its convenient disregard of practice or both. Both BOFIA and CBN’s Prudential Guidelines make provisions for insider-related transactions, premised on the understanding that excluding significant stakeholders in a company’s business may be tantamount to undermining same company. Prudential Guidelines define insiders to include “directors, significant shareholders, employees and investee companies (such as associates, subsidiaries, joint ventures) of banks, and other entities in which they have significant control”. In line with the BOFIA, the term “director” includes director’s wife, husband, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter and their spouses. A significant shareholder is regarded as someone holding at least 5.0 per cent ((individually or in aggregate) of a bank’s equity. The CBN requires that “Director, insider and significant shareholder credit exposure shall be fully disclosed by banks in their financial statements and returns prescribed by the Central Bank of Nigeria”. It also required banks to “ensure that their credit policies specifically address lending to directors as part of related parties or insiders lending policies”. In treating insiders’ loans, BOFIA states that a bank shall not lend “more than five per cent of its paid-up capital to any of its directors or significant shareholders provided that the aggregate of the bank’s exposure to all its directors and significant shareholders does not exceed 10 per cent of its paid up share capital or such percentage as the Bank (CBN) may prescribe”. Polaris Bank neither violates any principles in lending to directors nor the limits prescribed by the laws.
Claim 11: Classification of loans
The story sensationally ran the denotative classification of the loans as “lost”, implying that such classification meant that “it was not recovered by the bank” or not going to be paid back. In fact, its headline of “lost”, was casted on this wrong premise of understanding of classification of loans and the recoverable status. Classification of loans are guided by stipulated timelines by the CBN Prudential Guidelines and the terms associated with this classification are credit risk management references, not absolute ordinary meanings.
The CBN Prudential Guidelines state that a credit facility should be deemed as non-performing when interest or principal is due and unpaid for 90 days or more. The guidelines indicate that a loan can be substandard, doubtful or lost. A loan is subs-standard when unpaid principal or interest remain outstanding for more than 90 days but less than 180 days.
A loan is classified as doubtful when unpaid principal or interest remain outstanding for at least 180 days but less than 360 days. A loan is classified as lost when unpaid principal and or interest remain outstanding for 360 days or more. The CBN Prudential Guidelines state that for a facility granted to an “insider or related party credit”, which had been fully provided for, to be written off, “the approval of CBN is required”. This provision is higher than requirement for writing off provisioned lost loans by non-insider.
Motive analysis and convenient infidelity to facts
A general review of the story subjects the reporter to “motive analysis”, especially with its convenient infidelity to facts and figures and many “patterns of errors”. Was the report a targeted blackmail working to achieve a predetermined notion of characterization, rather than a professional analysis of financial report? Was the story in pattern of poor-taste, grant-chasing reports by a section of media seeking to demonise entities to secure funding? It was clear the reporter carefully “shuffled” facts and provided no basis for far-reaching assumptions and claims. While the reporter was copiously referring to unrelated businesses and current positions of the former directors, it failed to make similar efforts to reach out to the affected directors in the spirit of fair reporting.
Ethics
The report failed the ethical test, especially in the light of the “statement of principles” of both Economy Post and ICIR. Economy Post, set up in 2023, aims to promote responsible journalism that is fair, just and free from external corporate and political influences. The ICIR seeks to be an independent, non-profit news agency that promotes transparency and accountability through robust and objective investigative reporting. ICIR, particularly, failed to fact-check the report and its wholesale adoption of the story belied the enviable reputation of its board of trustees. Fairness, fact-checking and corrections are cardinal operating principles of ICIR reportage. ICIR commits: “We will take utmost care to be fair to all subjects in news stories. All sides of a story must have their say. Fairness is a cardinal requirement in Journalism, more so investigative reporting. If anybody is involved in anything that appears negative or unseemly, an extra effort must be made to get his own side of the story. If any such person declines comment, it should be so stated.
“Also, facts must be accurately presented. Facts are sacred. In dealing with sources, document, databases and the Internet, it is not enough to quote the information gotten correctly, an effort must be made to establish its accuracy. Where possible, cross check your facts again and again using different sources.
“The ICIR is committed to the principle of fairness and accuracy. Therefore, when we make a mistake, we will promptly correct it. If the correction is significant, we will explain the change and the reason for it. In addition, if there is an update to the story, we will provide clarification. And if the entire report is open to question or fails to meet our ethical standard, we will provide clarification signed by the editor”. With all these, it will be fair to expect ICIR to correct its mistake in reposting the misleading story, given numerous factual, operational and textual errors cited above. The story is below par and unseemly to the avowed ideals of ICIR.
In conclusion, the story “Polaris Bank loses N26bn loans granted to 6 ex-directors without collaterals” is erroneous and misleading, the bank has lost no money to ex-directors’ loans, as inappropriately claimed by the publication.
Ojedokun is a Lagos-based Independent Journalist/Analyst
Business
Recapitalisation Without Transformation is a Risk Nigeria Cannot Afford
Recapitalisation Without Transformation is a Risk Nigeria Cannot Afford
BY BLAISE UDUNZE
In barely two weeks, Nigeria’s banking sector will once again be at a historic turning point. As the deadline for the latest recapitalisation exercise approaches on March 31, 2026, with no fewer than 31 banks having met the new capital rule, leaving out two that are reportedly awaiting verification. As exercise progresses and draws to an end, policymakers are optimistic that stronger banks will anchor financial stability and support the country’s ambition of building a $1 trillion economy.
The reform, driven by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under Governor Olayemi Cardoso, requires banks to significantly raise their capital thresholds, which are set at N500 billion for international banks, N200 billion for national banks, and N50 billion for regional lenders. According to the apex bank, 33 banks have already tapped the capital market through rights issues and public offerings; collectively, the total verified and approved capital raised by the banks amounts to N4.05 trillion.
No doubt, at first glance, the strategy definitely appears straightforward with the idea that bigger capital means stronger banks, and stronger banks should finance economic growth. But history offers a cautionary reminder that capital alone does not guarantee resilience, as it would be recalled that Nigeria has travelled this road before.
During the 2004-2005 consolidation led by former CBN Governor Charles Soludo, the number of banks in the country shrank dramatically from 89 to 25. The reform created larger institutions that were celebrated as national champions. The truth is that Nigeria has been here before because, despite all said and done, barely five years later, the banking system plunged into crisis, forcing regulatory intervention, bailouts, and the creation of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) to absorb toxic assets.
The lesson from that experience is simple in the sense that recapitalisation without structural reform only postpones deeper problems.
Today, as banks race to meet the new capital thresholds, the real question is not how much capital has been raised but whether the reform will transform the fundamentals of Nigerian banking. The underlying fact is that if the exercise merely inflates balance sheets without addressing deeper vulnerabilities, Nigeria risks repeating a familiar cycle of apparent stability followed by systemic stress, as the resultant effect will be distressed banks less capable of bringing the economy out of the woods.
The real measure of success is far simpler. That is to say, stronger banks must stimulate economic productivity, stabilise the financial system, and expand access to credit for businesses and households. Anything less will amount to a missed opportunity.
One of the most critical issues surrounding the recapitalisation drive is the quality of the capital being raised.
Nigeria’s banking sector has reportedly secured more than N4.5 trillion in new capital commitments across different categories of banks. No doubt, on paper, these numbers may appear impressive. Going by the trends of events in Nigeria’s economy, numbers alone can be deceptive.
Past recapitalisation cycles revealed troubling practices, whereby funds raised through related-party transactions, borrowed money disguised as equity, or complex financial arrangements that recycled risks back into the banking system. If such practices resurface, recapitalisation becomes little more than an accounting exercise.
To avert a repeat of failure, the CBN must therefore ensure that every naira raised represents genuine, loss-absorbing capital. Transparency around capital sources, ownership structures, and funding arrangements must be non-negotiable. Without credible capital, balance sheet strength becomes an illusion that will make every recapitalization exercise futile.
In financial systems, credibility is itself a form of capital. If there is one recurring factor behind banking crises in Nigeria, it is corporate governance failure.
Many past collapses were not triggered by global shocks but by insider lending, weak board oversight, excessive executive power, and poor risk culture. Recapitalisation provides regulators with a rare opportunity to reset governance standards across the industry.
Boards must be independent not only in structure but also in substance. Risk committees must be empowered to challenge executive decisions. Insider lending rules must be enforced without compromise because, over the years, they have proven to be an anathema against the stability of the financial sector. The stakes are high.
When governance fails, fresh capital can quickly become fresh fuel for old excesses. Without governance reform, recapitalisation risks reinforcing the very weaknesses it seeks to eliminate.
Another structural vulnerability lies in Nigeria’s increasing amount of non-performing loans (NPLs), which recently caused the CBN to raise concerns, as Nigeria experiences a rise in bad loans threatening banking stability.
Industry data suggests that the banking sector’s NPL ratio has climbed above the prudential benchmark of 5 percent, reaching roughly 7 percent in recent assessments. Many of these troubled loans are concentrated in sectors such as oil and gas, power, and government-linked infrastructure projects, alongside other factors such as FX instability, high interest rates, and the withdrawal of Covid-era forbearance, which threaten bank stability.
While regulatory forbearance has helped maintain short-term stability, it has also obscured deeper asset-quality concerns. A credible recapitalisation process must confront this reality directly.
Loan classification standards must reflect economic truth rather than regulatory convenience. Banks should not carry impaired assets indefinitely while presenting healthy balance sheets to investors and depositors.
Transparency about asset quality strengthens trust. Concealment destroys it. Few forces have disrupted Nigerian bank balance sheets in recent years as severely as exchange-rate volatility.
Many banks still operate with significant foreign exchange mismatches, borrowing short-term in foreign currencies while lending long-term to clients earning revenues in naira. When the naira depreciates sharply, these mismatches can erode capital faster than any credit loss.
Recapitalisation must therefore be accompanied by stricter supervision of foreign exchange exposure, as this part calls for the regulator to heighten its supervision. Banks should be required to disclose currency risks more transparently and undergo rigorous stress testing at intervals that assume adverse currency scenarios rather than best-case outcomes. In a structurally import-dependent economy, ignoring FX risk is no longer an option.
Nigeria’s banking system has long been characterised by excessive concentration in a few sectors and corporate clients, which calls for adequate monitoring and the need to be addressed quickly for the recapitalization drive to yield maximum results.
Growth in most advanced economies comes from the small and medium-sized enterprises that are well-funded. Anything short of this undermines it, since the concentration of huge loans to large oil and gas companies, government-related entities, and major conglomerates absorbs a disproportionate share of bank lending. This has continued to pose a major threat to the system, as the case is with small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of job creation, which remain chronically underfinanced. This imbalance weakens the economy.
Recapitalisation should therefore be tied to policies that encourage credit diversification and risk-sharing mechanisms that allow banks to lend more confidently to productive sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and technology rather than investing their funds into the government’s securities. Bigger banks that remain narrowly exposed do not strengthen the economy. They amplify its fragilities.
Nigeria’s macroeconomic conditions, which are its broad economic settings, are defined by frequent and sometimes sharp changes or instability rather than stability.
Inflation shocks, interest-rate swings, fiscal pressures, and currency adjustments are not rare disruptions; but they have now become a normal part of the economic environment. Despite all these adverse factors, many banks still operate risk models that assume relative stability. Perhaps unbeknownst to the stakeholders, this disconnect is dangerous.
Owing to possible shocks, and when banks increase their capital (recapitalization), it is required that banks adopt more sophisticated risk-management frameworks capable of withstanding severe economic scenarios, with the expectation that stronger banks should also have stronger systems to manage risks and survive economic crises. In Nigeria today, every financial institution’s stress testing must be performed in the face of the economy facing severe shocks like currency depreciation, sovereign debt pressures, and sudden interest-rate spikes.
Risk management should evolve from a compliance obligation into a strategic discipline embedded in every lending decision.
Public confidence in the banking system depends heavily on credible financial reporting.
Investors, analysts, and depositors need to be able to understand banks’ true financial positions without navigating non-transparent disclosures or creative accounting practices, which means the industry must be liberated to an extent that gives room for access to information.
Recapitalisation provides an opportunity to strengthen the enforcement of international financial reporting standards, enhance audit quality, and require clearer disclosure of capital adequacy, asset quality, and related-party transactions. Transparency should not be feared. It is the foundation of trust.
One thing that must be corrected is that while recapitalisation often focuses on financial metrics, the banking sector ultimately runs on human capital.
Another fearful aspect of this exercise for the economy is that consolidation and mergers triggered by the reform could lead to workforce disruptions if not carefully managed. Job losses, casualisation, and declining staff morale can weaken institutional culture and productivity. Strong banks are built by strong people.
If recapitalisation strengthens balance sheets while destabilising the workforce that powers the system, the reform risks undermining its own economic objectives. Human capital stability must therefore form part of the broader reform strategy.
Doubtless, another emerging shift in Nigeria’s financial landscape is the rise of digital financial platforms that are increasingly changing how people access and use money in Nigeria.
Millions of Nigerians are increasingly relying on fintech platforms for payments, microloans, and everyday financial transactions. One of the advantages it offers, is that these services often deliver faster and more user-friendly experiences than traditional banks. While innovation is welcome, it raises important questions about the future structure of financial intermediation.
The point here is that the moment traditional banks retreat from retail banking while fintech platforms dominate customer interactions, systemic liquidity and regulatory oversight could become fragmented.
The CBN must see to it that the recapitalised banks must therefore invest aggressively in digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and customer experience, while cutting down costs on all less critical areas in the industry.
Nigerians should feel the benefits of recapitalisation not only in stronger balance sheets but also in faster apps, reliable payment systems, and responsive customer service.
As banks grow larger through recapitalisation and consolidation, a new challenge emerges via systemic concentration.
Nigeria’s largest banks already control a significant share of industry assets. Further consolidation could deepen the divide between dominant institutions and smaller players. This creates the risk of “too-big-to-fail” banks whose collapse could threaten the entire financial system.
To address this risk, regulators must strengthen resolution frameworks that allow distressed banks to fail without triggering systemic panic, their collapse does not damage the whole financial system, and do not require taxpayer-funded bailouts to forestall similar mistakes that occurred with the liquidation of Heritage Bank. Market discipline depends on credible failure mechanisms.
It must be understood that Nigeria’s banking recapitalisation is not merely a financial exercise or, better still, increasing banks’ capital. It is a rare opportunity to rebuild trust, strengthen governance, and reposition the financial system as a true engine of economic development.
One fact is that if the reform focuses only on capital numbers, the country risks repeating a familiar pattern of churning out impressive balance sheets followed by another cycle of crisis.
But the actors in this exercise must ensure that the recapitalisation addresses governance failures, asset quality concerns, risk management weaknesses, and transparency gaps; and the moment this is done, the banking sector could emerge stronger and more resilient.
Nigeria does not simply need bigger banks. It needs better banks, institutions capable of financing innovation, supporting entrepreneurs, and building economic opportunity for millions of citizens.
The true capital of any banking system is not just money. It is trust. And whether this recapitalisation ultimately succeeds will depend on whether Nigerians see that trust reflected not only in financial statements but in the everyday experience of saving, borrowing, and investing in the economy. Only then will bigger banks translate into a stronger nation.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
Business
FirstBank Makes Home Ownership Possible for Nigerians with Single-Digit Interest Rate Loan
FirstBank Makes Home Ownership Possible for Nigerians with Single-Digit Interest Rate Loan
For millions of Nigerians, homeownership has long felt like an ambition deferred. Squeezed by rising property prices, persistent double-digit inflation and high commercial lending rates, the dream of owning a home has remained just that – a dream.
But that narrative is quietly changing. Thanks to FirstBank.
The N1 Trillion Intervention Reshaping Access
In partnership with the Ministry of Finance Incorporated Real Estate Investment Fund (MREIF), FirstBank has unveiled a mortgage opportunity that could redefine access to housing finance in Nigeria.
Backed by the Federal Government’s N1trillion mortgage fund, the initiative is designed to empower Nigerians with affordable, long-term credit to own their homes.
9.75% Interest Rate in a 30% Lending Environment
MREIF is priced at 9.75% per annum, dramatically lower than prevailing commercial loan rates. Eligible Nigerians can access up to N100 million and repay within 20 years. This translates into significantly more manageable monthly repayments and greater long-term financial stability.
Built for Salary Earners, Entrepreneurs and the Diaspora
The MREIF mortgage facility has been structured to be inclusive. It is available to salary account holders, business owners and diaspora customers. Whether you are a young professional aiming to exit the rent cycle, an entrepreneur building generational stability, or you’re a Nigerian abroad looking to secure assets locally, the product opens a pathway that has historically been out of reach for many.
Taking the First Step
For those who have been waiting for the right time, this is definitely it. The question is no longer whether homeownership is possible. The real question is: will you act before the window narrows?
Visit https://www.firstbanknigeria.com/personal/loans/mreif-home-loan/ and in no time you could be the latest homeowner in town.
Bank
Alpha Morgan Bank Deepens Presence in Abuja with New Branch in Utako
Alpha Morgan Bank Deepens Presence in Abuja with New Branch in Utako
Marking another milestone in its expansion drive, Alpha Morgan Bank has opened a new branch in Utako, Abuja, reinforcing its strategy of building closer institutional ties within key business communities and bringing its financial expertise closer to individuals, and enterprises driving the city’s growth.
The new branch, located at Plot 1121 Obafemi Awolowo Way, Utako, Abuja is strategically positioned to serve individuals, entrepreneurs, and corporate clients within Utako and surrounding districts.
The expansion follows the Bank’s recently concluded Economic Review Webinar held in February 2026, as the bank continues to position as a thought-leader in the financial services industry.
Speaking on the opening, Ade Buraimo, Managing Director of Alpha Morgan Bank, said the move underscores the Bank’s commitment to accessibility and service excellence.
“Proximity matters in banking. As communities grow and commercial activity expands, financial institutions also evolve to meet customers where they are. The Utako Branch allows us to deliver our services to people in that community efficiently while maintaining the high standards our customers expect,”
The Utako location will provide a full suite of retail and corporate banking services, including account opening, deposits, transfers, business banking solutions, and financial advisory support.
Customers and members of the public are invited to visit the new Utako Branch to experience the Bank’s approach to satisfying banking.
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