Business
President Tinubu’s New 15% Imported Petrol and Diesel Tariff: A Bold Step or a Monopoly Trap?
President Tinubu’s New 15% Imported Petrol and Diesel Tariff: A Bold Step or a Monopoly Trap?
By George Omagbemi Sylvester | Published by saharaweeklyng.com
“A policy pitched as industrial protection and forex salvation; but does it protect Nigerians or consolidate a refinery monopoly?”
President Bola Tinubu’s recent approval of a 15 per cent ad-valorem import duty on refined petroleum products – petrol (PMS) and diesel (AGO) – was sold to Nigerians as tough, necessary medicine, protect domestic refining, preserve foreign exchange and reward a multi-billion-dollar private investment that finally began producing at scale. The logic is tidy in boardroom slide decks; raise the cost of cheap imports, make locally refined product price-competitive, nurture domestic industry and reduce the chronic hemorrhage of foreign exchange on refined fuels. Though policy is about consequences, not slogans. What the government calls protection risks becoming patronage; what it calls industrial policy could become the legal scaffolding for a monopoly.
The 15% duty was first approved and announced late October 2025 as part of a package of fiscal measures intended to shore up non-oil revenues and to secure the gains of the country’s nascent private refining capacity. The move came after the Dangote Petroleum Refinery (a $20 billion megaproject that began producing refined fuels in 2024) reached commercial throughput, prompting the government to incentivise local supply over imports. Proponents argue that the tariff would close the gap between imported product and locally refined output, prevent undercutting by underpriced foreign loads and protect what the government now frames as strategic industrial security.
On paper the argument has merit. Nigeria, paradoxically one of the world’s major crude oil producers, has for decades exported crude and imported refined products, a distortion that the Dangote refinery promised to end. Shielding nascent domestic refining from predatory pricing can be a legitimate industrial policy. Economies of scale take time; infant industries sometimes need temporary protection to survive; and the nation stands to gain from jobs, downstream activity and a retained share of the petroleum value chain. These are not fanciful claims, they are the underpinnings of industrial strategy everywhere.
The devil is in the detail and the distribution of beneficiaries. From the moment the policy was mooted, alarm bells rang among independent marketers, traders and many civil society groups. Their fear is simple and stark, a 15% import tariff applied in a market where one private refinery already produces a volume close to national demand risks removing competitors from the market, leaving one dominant supplier to set prices, ration supply and extract rents. In short: protection can calcify into monopoly. The concerns were not idle: within weeks of the tariff’s announcement traders warned that importers (many of whom supply the country’s internal distribution network and buffer the system in times of shortages) could be pushed out of the market, reducing supply diversity and increasing vulnerability to shortages and price shocks.
The Dangote Group and others publicly welcomed the policy, arguing it would stabilise supply and prevent substandard imports. Dangote’s spokesperson argued the tariff would not push up pump prices but would protect the industry and the economy. Yet a policy that appears to hand advantage to one private operator (even if unintentionally) invites suspicion. Critics pointed out that the refinery’s special economic arrangements (including Free Trade or EPZ-style privileges in some reporting) could leave independent importers bearing the full cost of the new duty while the privileged refinery remains insulated; a recipe for market capture.
And then the backlash swelled. Fuel marketers, unions, manufacturing bodies and some economists warned of immediate inflationary pass-through, higher transport costs and pressure on households already pushed to the brink by earlier economic reforms. Economist Gbolahan Olojede warned the duty could “reignite inflationary pressures” and cautioned against opaque implementation. Opinion pieces and industry briefs argued that a 15 per cent levy could add close to ₦95–₦100 per litre before storage, transport and margins, a reality with direct consequences for food prices, commuting costs and the competitiveness of Nigerian industry. These are not academic concerns in a country where a marginal uptick in fuel cost ripples quickly through the economy.
Faced with rising public unease and warnings from the trade and logistics end of the value chain (and with the peak holiday demand season approaching) the government stepped back. In mid-November 2025 the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA) announced a halt/suspension of the planned tariff implementation, signalling a reversal of the deadline and committing to continued monitoring of supply to prevent disruption. That pause exposed the core political arithmetic, a policy that hits the pump in the short term is politically toxic, even if defensible in the abstract. The suspension also exposed the weak consultative process around the measure; a rushed political fiat had to be walked back after stakeholders made their costs plain.
So where does that leave us? First, industrial protection without clear, time-bound guardrails is dangerous. Tariffs and duties can be used for legitimate industrial nurturing – but only when accompanied by competition safeguards, transparent exemptions, clearly published beneficiary lists, and sunset clauses. Second, the policy exposes Nigeria’s policy-making pathologies: an over-reliance on headline fiscal fixes announced without rigorous stakeholder modelling and without mandated impact assessments. Third, the episode highlights a deeper governance question: when a single private actor commands such strategic weight in a sector, policy needs to be exquisitely careful not to create the impression (or the reality) of state policy tailored to a single firm’s advantage.
There is a third dimension: currency and balance-of-payments logic. Reducing fuel imports would save foreign exchange and strengthen the naira (a true national boon) but only if domestic refineries can reliably meet demand, maintain quality standards and supply at competitive prices. Short-run protection that drives up the pump price without commensurate increase in domestic output simply trades forex savings for inflation pain and social discontent. In that light, the responsible path would have been a staged approach: phased tariffs tied to verified increases in domestic refining output, mandatory wholesale price monitoring, strong anti-hoarding enforcement and legislative guardrails against anti-competitive behaviour.
If we are to be patriotic (if we genuinely want Dangote and any other domestic refiner to succeed) then success must be broad, lawful and visibly pro-competitive. Policy should reward production, not penalise competition. The state must ensure that any tariff is matched by clear rules: fixed windows for imports for small marketers, credit facilities to help domestic distribution adapt and legal anti-monopoly protections enforced by an empowered regulator. Without such mechanisms, the 15% duty risks becoming a short cut to concentrated market power and, eventually, to higher prices for ordinary Nigerians.
President Tinubu’s impulse to protect domestic refining is understandable and defensible in principle. But good intent does not substitute for prudent design. The recent suspension was a salutary reminder: economic management in Nigeria cannot be a monthly toggle between headline reform and crisis control. If this tariff is ever reintroduced, it must be transparent, time-bound, conditional on measurable domestic output increases, and paired with competition safeguards and social mitigation measures for low-income households.
In the end, Nigerians will judge policy by what they pay at the pump and whether they can feed their families. A tariff that secures refining jobs and strengthens the naira while keeping pumps stable would be a courageous, strategic win. A tariff that quietly abets market concentration and hands an overwhelming commercial advantage to a single refinery will be remembered as a policy that traded public interest for private gain. The difference between a bold step and a monopoly trap is not rhetorical (it is procedural, technical and enforceable. It is also, crucially, reversible) if we have the political will to put transparent guardrails in place before it is too late.
Business
BUA Foods Records 91% Surge in Profit After Tax, Hits ₦508bn in 2025
BUA Foods Records 91% Surge in Profit After Tax, Hits ₦508bn in 2025
By femi Oyewale
Business
Adron Homes Unveils “Love for Love” Valentine Promo with Exciting Discounts, Luxury Gifts, and Travel Rewards
Adron Homes Unveils “Love for Love” Valentine Promo with Exciting Discounts, Luxury Gifts, and Travel Rewards
In celebration of the season of love, Adron Homes and Properties has announced the launch of its special Valentine campaign, “Love for Love” Promo, a customer-centric initiative designed to reward Nigerians who choose to express love through smart, lasting real estate investments.
The Love for Love Promo offers clients attractive discounts, flexible payment options, and an array of exclusive gift items, reinforcing Adron Homes’ commitment to making property ownership both rewarding and accessible. The campaign runs throughout the Valentine season and applies to the company’s wide portfolio of estates and housing projects strategically located across Nigeria.
Speaking on the promo, the company’s Managing Director, Mrs Adenike Ajobo, stated that the initiative is aimed at encouraging individuals and families to move beyond conventional Valentine gifts by investing in assets that secure their future. According to the company, love is best demonstrated through stability, legacy, and long-term value—principles that real estate ownership represents.
Under the promo structure, clients who make a payment of ₦100,000 receive cake, chocolates, and a bottle of wine, while those who pay ₦200,000 are rewarded with a Love Hamper. Payments of ₦500,000 attract a Love Hamper plus cake, and clients who pay ₦1,000,000 enjoy a choice of a Samsung phone or a Love Hamper with cake.
The rewards become increasingly premium as commitment grows. Clients who pay ₦5,000,000 receive either an iPad or an all-expenses-paid romantic getaway for a couple at one of Nigeria’s finest hotels, which includes two nights’ accommodation, special treats, and a Love Hamper. A payment of ₦10,000,000 comes with a choice of a Samsung Z Fold 7, three nights at a top-tier resort in Nigeria, or a full solar power installation.
For high-value investors, the Love for Love Promo delivers exceptional lifestyle experiences. Clients who pay ₦30,000,000 on land are rewarded with a three-night couple’s trip to Doha, Qatar, or South Africa, while purchasers of any Adron Homes house valued at ₦50,000,000 receive a double-door refrigerator.
The promo covers Adron Homes’ estates located in Lagos, Shimawa, Sagamu, Atan–Ota, Papalanto, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Osun, Ekiti, Abuja, Nasarawa, and Niger States, offering clients the opportunity to invest in fast-growing, strategically positioned communities nationwide.
Adron Homes reiterated that beyond the incentives, the campaign underscores the company’s strong reputation for secure land titles, affordable pricing, strategic locations, and a proven legacy in real estate development.
As Valentine’s Day approaches, Adron Homes encourages Nigerians at home and in the diaspora to take advantage of the Love for Love Promo to enjoy exceptional value, exclusive rewards, and the opportunity to build a future rooted in love, security, and prosperity.
Business
Why Nigeria’s Banks Still on Shaky Ground with Big Profits, Weak Capital
*Why Nigeria’s Banks Still on Shaky Ground with Big Profits, Weak Capital*
*BY BLAISE UDUNZE*
Despite the fragile 2024 economy grappling with inflation, currency volatility, and weak growth, Nigeria’s banking industry was widely portrayed as successful and strong amid triumphal headlines. The figures appeared to signal strength, resilience, and superior management as the Tier-1 banks such as Access Bank, Zenith Bank, GTBank, UBA, and First Bank of Nigeria, collectively reported profits approaching, and in some cases exceeding, N1 trillion. Surprisingly, a year later, these same banks touted as sound and solid are locked in a frenetic race to the capital markets, issuing rights offers and public placements back-to-back to meet the Central Bank of Nigeria’s N500 billion recapitalisation thresholds.
The contradiction is glaring. If Nigeria’s biggest banks are so profitable, why are they unable to internally fund their new capital requirements? Why have no fewer than 27 banks tapped the capital market in quick succession despite repeated assurances of balance-sheet robustness? And more fundamentally, what do these record profits actually say about the real health of the banking system?
The recapitalisation directive announced by the CBN in 2024 was ambitious by design. Banks with international licences were required to raise minimum capital to N500 billion by March 2026, while national and regional banks faced lower but still substantial thresholds ranging from N200 billion to N50 billion, respectively. Looking at the policy, it was sold as a modern reform meant to make banks stronger, more resilient in tough times, and better able to support major long-term economic development. In theory, strong banks should welcome such reforms. In practice, the scramble that followed has exposed uncomfortable truths about the structure of bank profitability in Nigeria.
At the heart of the inconsistency is a fundamental misunderstanding often encouraged by the banks themselves between profits and capital. Unknown to many, profitability, no matter how impressive, does not automatically translate into regulatory capital. Primarily, the CBN’s recapitalisation framework actually focuses on money paid in by shareholders when buying shares, fresh equity injected by investors over retained earnings or profits that exist mainly on paper.
This distinction matters because much of the profit surge recorded in 2024 and early 2025 was neither cash-generative nor sustainably repeatable. A significant portion of those headline banks’ profits reported actually came from foreign exchange revaluation gains following the sharp fall of the naira after exchange-rate unification. The industry witnessed that banks’ holding dollar-denominated assets their books showed bigger numbers as their balance sheets swell in naira terms, creating enormous paper profits without a corresponding improvement in underlying operational strength. These gains inflated income statements but did little to strengthen core capital, especially after the CBN barred banks from using FX revaluation gains for dividends or routine operations. In effect, banks looked richer without becoming stronger.
Beyond FX effects, Nigerian banks have increasingly relied on non-interest income fees, charges, and transaction levies to drive profitability. While this model is lucrative, it does not necessarily deepen financial intermediation or expand productive lending. High profits built on customer charges rather than loan growth offer limited support for long-term balance-sheet expansion. They also leave banks vulnerable when macroeconomic conditions shift, as is now happening.
Indeed, the recapitalisation exercise coincides with a turning point in the monetary cycle. The extraordinary conditions that supported bank earnings in 2024 and 2025 are beginning to unwind. Analysts now warn that Nigerian banks are approaching earnings reset, as net interest margins the backbone of traditional banking profitability, come under sustained pressure.
Renaissance Capital, in a January note, projects that major banks including Zenith, GTCO, Access Holdings, and UBA will struggle to deliver earnings growth in 2026 comparable to recent performance.
In a real sense, the CBN is expected to lower interest rates by 400 to 500 basis points because inflation is slowing down, and this means that banks will earn less on loans and government bonds, but they may not be able to quickly lower the interest they pay on deposits or other debts. The cash reserve requirements are still elevated, which does not earn interest; banks can’t easily increase or expand lending investments to make up for lower returns. The implications are significant. Net interest margin, the difference between what banks earn on loans and investments and what they pay on deposits, is poised to contract. Deposit competition is intensifying as lenders fight to shore up liquidity ahead of recapitalisation deadlines, pushing up funding costs. At the same time, yields on treasury bills and bonds, long a safe and lucrative haven for banks are expected to soften in a lower-rate environment. The result is a narrowing profit cushion just as banks are being asked to carry far larger equity bases.
Compounding this challenge is the fading of FX revaluation windfalls. With the naira relatively more stable in early 2026, the non-cash gains that once flattered bank earnings have largely evaporated. What remains is the less glamorous reality of core banking operations: credit risk management, cost efficiency, and genuine loan growth in a sluggish economy. In this new environment, maintaining headline profits will be far harder, even before accounting for the dilutive impact of recapitalisation.
That dilution is another underappreciated consequence of the capital rush. Massive share issuances mean that even if banks manage to sustain absolute profit levels, earnings per share and return on equity are likely to decline. Zenith, Access, UBA, and others are dramatically increasing their share counts. The same earnings pie is now being divided among many more shareholders, making individual returns leaner than during the pre-recapitalisation boom. For investors, the optics of strong profits may soon give way to the reality of weaker per-share performance.
Yet banks have pressed ahead, not only out of regulatory necessity but also strategic calculation.
During this period of recapitalization, investors are interested in the stock market with optimism, especially about bank shares, as banks are raising fresh capital, and this makes it easier to attract investments. This has become a season for the management teams to seize the moment to raise funds at relatively attractive valuations, strengthen ownership positions, and position themselves for post-recapitalisation dominance. In several cases, major shareholders and insiders have increased their stakes, as projected in the media, signalling confidence in long-term prospects even as near-term returns face pressure.
There is also a broader structural ambition at play. Well-capitalised banks can take on larger single obligor exposures, finance infrastructure projects, expand regionally, and compete more credibly with pan-African and global peers. From this perspective, recapitalisation is not merely about compliance but about reshaping the competitive hierarchy of Nigerian banking. What will be witnessed in the industry is that those who succeed will emerge larger, fewer, and more powerful. Those that fail will be forced into consolidation, retreat, or irrelevance.
For the wider economy, the outcome is ambiguous. Stronger banks with deeper capital buffers could improve systemic stability and enhance Nigeria’s ability to fund long-term development. The point is that while merging or consolidating banks may make them safer, it can also harm the market and the economy because it will reduce competition, let a few banks dominate, and encourage them to earn easy money from bonds and fees instead of funding real businesses. The truth be told, injecting more capital into the banks without complementary reforms in credit infrastructure, risk-sharing mechanisms, and fiscal discipline, isn’t enough as the aforementioned reforms are also needed.
The rush as exposed in this period, is that the moment Nigerian banks started raising new capital, the glaring reality behind their reported profits became clearer, that profits weren’t purely from good management, while the financial industry is not as sound and strong as its headline figures. The fact that trillion-naira profit banks must return repeatedly to shareholders for fresh capital is not a sign of excess strength, but of structural imbalance.
With the deadline for banks to raise new capital coming soon, by 31 March 2026, the focus has shifted from just raising N500 billion. N200 billion or N50 billion to think about the future shape and quality of Nigeria’s financial industry, or what it will actually look like afterward. Will recapitalisation mark a turning point toward deeper intermediation, lower dependence on speculative gains, and stronger support for economic growth? Or will it simply reset the numbers while leaving underlying incentives unchanged?
The answer will define the next chapter of Nigerian banking long after the capital market roadshows have ended and the profit headlines have faded.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
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